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DEPT FOR T, VC AND EUR/PRA
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CIA FOR WINPAC
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/25/2019

TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START

SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA
(SFO-GVA-VII): (U) AD HOC GROUP MEETING, NOVEMBER 19, 2009

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).

¶1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VII-037.

¶2. (U) Meeting Date: November 19, 2009
Time: 10:00 A.M. - 12:50 P.M.
Place: Russian Mission, Geneva

SUMMARY

¶3. (S) At the Ad Hoc Group meeting chaired by Secretary of Defense Representative Dr. Warner and Russian Ministry of Defense Representative Colonel Ilin, Assistant Secretary Gottemoeller presented the U.S. streamlined package for mobile missiles. The Russian side stated the U.S. proposal for the elimination of Russian road-mobile ICBMs and their associated launch canisters should also apply to U.S. SLBMs and SLBM loading tubes. Mr. Siemon briefed the Russian Delegation on the six components of the U.S. telemetry proposal. The Russian side stated that it could not agree to the U.S. proposal since telemetric information was only used to verify ballistic missile throw-weight and warhead attribution, which were not limited by the new treaty. The Russian side also noted that the United States could use Russian-provided telemetric information to improve its missile defense systems.

¶4. (U) Subject Summary: Streamlined Package on Mobile Missiles; Questions From the Russian Side; Unique IDs; U.S. Telemetry Proposal; Russian Objections to Telemetry;

Telemetry Increases Transparency and Confidence; Issues That Must be Resolved Before Movement Can be Made; and, Makarov/Mullen Meeting.

STREAMLINED PACKAGE
ON MOBILE MISSILES

15. (S) Gottemoeller began the meeting by presenting the U.S. streamlined package on mobile missiles. She stated she was asked to personally deliver the points.

Begin points.

- Unique Identifier: The United States continues to believe that, in order to assist in monitoring the total number of mobile ICBMs produced, and tracking the individual missiles throughout their life cycles, each mobile ICBM and its launch canister should be marked with a "unique identifier" (UID). The United States remains willing to permit the use of the unique tail number on each U.S. and Russian heavy bomber as a UID for heavy bombers.

- Production Notification: In lieu of continuous monitoring at production facilities for mobile ICBMs, the United States has previously proposed that the Russian Federation notify the United States, 60 hours before the exit of a mobile ICBM from the Votkinsk Final Assembly Plant, of the impending exit of a mobile ICBM and provide the appropriate missile UID. If this advance notification requirement can be agreed, the

United States is prepared to drop its proposal for the placement of a camera for remote monitoring at that facility, the Votkinsk facility. The United States remains willing to offer reciprocal notifications of exits of missiles from an analogous U.S. missile production facility.

- Observation of the Final Cuts for Eliminations: The United States proposes that for all ICBMs and SLBMs, only the elimination of the first stage, as well as the associated launch canister if so equipped, is required for the elimination of the missile. U.S. acceptance of this requirement is predicated on inspectors having the right to observe the final cuts of the motor casing for the first stage of a mobile ICBM and of the launch canister for that ICBM.

- The United States could agree to a modified procedure for elimination of mobile launchers of ICBMs that would shorten inspection time and facilitate Russia's use of the remaining vehicle for purposes not inconsistent with the treaty as follows: Inspectors would have the right to observe the final step of the elimination process, i.e., cutting off the mountings of the erector-launcher mechanism. Further, the front leveling jacks would remain intact, but 0.78 meters of the chassis would be cut off. Washington does not believe it necessary to include data on eliminated launchers in the Memorandum of Understanding, or to inspect such launchers after they have been eliminated in this manner. The United States could agree to this elimination procedure if Russia will provide assurances that it will not permit the transfer of such eliminated launchers to parties outside of Russia.

- The United States continues to maintain that special verification measures are needed to address the unique difficulties associated with monitoring mobile missiles. To address Russian concerns, we propose to keep unique provisions to a minimum. Accordingly, we have further simplified proposed provisions affecting mobile ICBMs and mobile ICBM launchers while maintaining what we view to be the minimum necessary for verification.

End points.

QUESTIONS FROM THE RUSSIAN SIDE

¶ 16. (S) Gottemoeller asked if the Russian side had questions, noting that, questions of a technical nature should be left for the Ad Hoc Group to discuss. General Poznihir asked if the streamlined package replaced all other measures for mobile launchers and their ICBMs, to which Gottemoeller replied, all other measures for mobile launchers and ICBMs for mobile launchers remained on the table. This being the case, Ambassador Antonov asked what was new in the U.S. streamlined package. Gottemoeller explained that the United States had organized its discussion of mobile ICBMs based on the life cycle of such mobile missiles and their launchers: the production phase, deployment phase and elimination phase.

The proposals in the streamlined package dealt with the production and elimination phases of the mobile ICBM life cycle. All measures dealing with the deployment phase were unchanged and remained on the table. Colonel Ryzhkov stated that he understood the procedures in the package dealing with

the elimination of the first stages of ICBMs and SLBMs and the elimination of the launch canisters for mobile ICBMs. He asked if the proposal included similar procedures for the elimination of loading tubes for SLBMs. The question was expanded by Ilin asking if Russian inspectors would have the right to view the final elimination procedures for such loading tubes, as well as, ICBMs and SLBMs.

¶ 17. (S) Mr. Elliott indicated that the new U.S. proposal regarding mobile ICBMs included common procedures for the elimination of all ICBMs and SLBMs and their associated launch canisters. Because the relationship of a U.S. SLBM to a loading tube was different than that of a mobile ICBM to its launch canister, the package elimination procedures did not extend to the elimination of loading tubes. Elaborating, Elliott pointed out the mobile ICBM and its launch canister are linked to one another. Unlike the one-to-one relationship of the mobile ICBM to its launch canister, there were many more SLBMs in the U.S. inventory than SLBM loading tubes and the linked relationship did not exist. Ryzhkov stated that the U.S. proposal was contrary to the Russian concept of similar elimination procedures for all solid propellant ICBMs and SLBMs and would again require Russia to spend money it had not intended to fund U.S. observation of Russian mobile ICBM elimination; inflicting an additional economic burden on Russia.

UNIQUE IDS

¶ 18. (S) General Orlov responded to the U.S. offer to provide UIDs for U.S. heavy bombers, stating he believed the United States should provide UIDs for its SLBMs rather than its heavy bombers. He noted Russia could not accept the proposal to provide heavy bomber tail numbers since Russian bombers did not have tail numbers, they had individual names. He asserted that the Russian side would consider the offer more equal if the U.S. proposed to provide UIDs for all of its SLBMs.

¶ 19. (S) Dr. Warner explained that the United States had thought seriously about placing UIDs on its ICBMs and SLBMs, however, they would not be visible to Russian inspectors since only the front section of the ICBMs and SLBMs were visible during warhead inspections once these missiles were deployed.

¶ 10. (S) Gottemoeller suggested that further discussion of the new U.S. proposal take place in the Ad Hoc Group and noted she believes that these topics would be discussed at the upcoming Genera Makarov/Admiral Mullen meeting. The first portion of the meeting concluded, Gottemoeller and Antonov departed, and discussion continued within the AD Hoc Group.

U.S. TELEMETRY PROPOSAL

¶11. (S) Mr. Siemon made a presentation on the components of the U.S. proposal regarding the continued provision of telemetry in the START Follow-on (SFO) treaty. Siemon stated the U.S. proposal for telemetry contained six basic elements

that were similar to those contained in START: 1) A provision on non-interference with national technical means (NTM) of verification; 2) a ban on the encryption of telemetric data; 3) notification of flight tests under the 1988 Ballistic Missile Launch Notification Agreement, including telemetry broadcast frequencies to be expressed in megahertz to the nearest one megahertz; information on modulation types; and information as to whether the flight test was to employ encapsulation or encryption; 4) exchange of recorded media and associated playback equipment; 5) exchange of interpretive data for the separation of the missile stages and the operation of the post-boost vehicle; and 6) provision for a limited number of flight tests each year during which encryption of telemetric data could be used.

¶12. (S) Siemon noted the provision for non-interference with NTM existed in the SALT I, SALT II, INF and START treaties. In the current proposed text for the SFO treaty, this ban existed in Article IX or Article X depending on the Russian- or U.S.-proposed text. It was difficult to understand why the ban was not included in the Russian-proposed text since it was in these other treaties agreed to by the Soviet Union and Russian Federation. Siemon indicated the information, which would be provided associated with flight tests, reflected the information that was required to attain the minimum amount of information by NTM. He stated that the proposal provided for encryption on a specified number of flight tests on an annual basis. The U.S.-proposed SFO text provided more flexibility in this regard than in START. Encryption would be used only during flight tests of ICBMs or SLBMs of existing types that were deployed as of treaty signature, but none of which were deployed at the time of the flight test, as well as during no more than a total of two flight tests each year of ICBMs of existing types that were deployed and two flight tests each year of SLBMs of existing types that were deployed for each Party.

¶13. (S) Siemon stated the United States believed these factors provided for transparency, confidence-building and predictability, which together enhanced strategic stability over the longer term between the United States and Russia. This was an important objective and was consistent with the Joint Understanding signed by Presidents Obama and Medvedev in July 2009. Siemon noted that, in the long run as each side fielded new ICBMs and SLBMs, the U.S.-proposed telemetry provision would prove very useful to both sides.

RUSSIAN OBJECTIONS TO TELEMETRY

¶14. (S) Ilin noted on September 21, 2009, during Session V of the negotiations, that the Russian side had made a presentation on why it rejected provisions regarding telemetry in the new treaty and the Russian position had not changed since that date. In SALT I, SALT II, and START, telemetry had a specific purpose. Telemetry was used by the Parties to verify throw-weight which, in turn, was used to calculate the maximum number of warheads an ICBM or SLBM was able to carry. The new SFO treaty does not contain any limits on throw-weight or attribution regarding the warheads on ballistic missiles. Therefore, telemetry would serve no purpose in SFO.

¶15. (S) Moreover, Ilin argued Russia believed telemetry on Russian ballistic missile flight tests could be used to improve the design of U.S. missile defense systems. Unlike the INF and START treaties, which were signed when the ABM Treaty still existed and the Parties recognized the relationship between these treaties and the ABM Treaty, the United States was unwilling to make a statement in SFO recognizing the interrelationship between strategic offensive

arms and missile defense systems.

¶16. (S) Ilin noted that, during START, problems were identified with the provision of telemetric information and the equipment for playback. These unresolved issues made the provision of telemetry in SFO impossible. He reiterated that the rationale for the provision of telemetric information was linked to verification and this type of verification did not exist in SFO.

¶17. (S) Siemon noted that the U.S. position on telemetry also had not changed since September 21, 2009. He emphasized the U.S.-proposed telemetry provisions would not provide specific details on the construction and configuration of the missile, reentry vehicles, or penetration aids; which was the type of information needed to develop and design a missile defense system. The telemetric information would allow the other side to determine the number of procedures for dispensing penetration aids. It would not, however, reveal information about the characteristics and capabilities of penetration aids that would allow the other side to defeat penetration aids, and other missile defense countermeasures.

¶18. (S) Telemetry, under START and under the U.S. proposal for SFO, did not provide identification data for parameters or information on how to convert quantities into real physical values, except for a limited number of functional parameters, such as stage separation, reentry vehicles separation, and acceleration of the stages and self-contained dispensing mechanism. The absence of such information limited the value of the telemetry for determining more than the basics about the operation of the missile, self-contained dispensing mechanism, and the reentry vehicles.

¶19. (S) Referring back to the six basic elements of telemetry laid out earlier, Siemon said he understood Russia's lack of satisfaction with the U.S.-provided telemetry playback equipment. He could also understand Russia's position against provision of interpretive data and the agreement not to interfere with the NTM of each side. He could not understand why the Russian side could not agree to a ban on telemetry encryption. Given these objections, Siemon asked if it was Russia's intention to encrypt missile test telemetry when the new treaty entered into force.

¶20. (S) Ilin said Russia had a different view on the benefits the U.S. revived from telemetry in improving its ballistic missile defense capabilities, especially since the United States had plans to improve its missile defense system. Russia's plans to encrypt missile flight test telemetry after entry into force of the new SFO treaty would be based on the purpose of the particular flight tests. Use of encryption would be guided by national security needs, therefore, Russia could not agree on a ban on telemetry encryption. He stated that, although Russia did not have issues with all six of the basic elements presented by

Siemon, it treated the six elements as a package and it could not accept that package.

TELEMETRY INCREASES
TRANSPARENCY AND CONFIDENCE

¶21. (S) Warner explained that throw-weight would not be used for determining RV attribution for ballistic missiles as it had in other treaties dealing with the reduction of strategic offensive arms. Telemetric information throw-weight in the new treaty was important to understanding the new type of ICBM and SLBM capabilities each side was in the process of developing and possibly fielding. The United States believed that telemetric information on the throw-weight of new types of missiles was an important parameter. Access to uninterrupted telemetric information from ICBM and SLBM flight tests promoted increased transparency and mutual confidence which is important for maintaining strategic stability.

¶22. (S) Warner stated that the question of whether telemetry could help in improvement of a missile defense system was worthy of a detailed discussion, but said he doubted there were new key insights that telemetry could provide for improvement of U.S. BMD.

ISSUES THAT MUST BE RESOLVED
BEFORE MOVEMENT CAN BE MADE

¶23. (S) Ilin presented a list of issues, apparently based upon discussions in the MOU Working Group, that the Russian side believed must be resolved before any real movement could be made in agreeing on treaty text. The list included: (1) U.S. insistence on listing items in the MOU that Russia believed were not strategic offensive arms; 2) U.S. insistence on using the word "nuclear" in front of warhead throughout the treaty; 3) the fact that the United States had not responded to the Russian proposal on counting deployed and non-deployed mobile ICBM launchers (what are we going to count?); 4) Counting rules for heavy bomber nuclear armaments; 5) UIDs for mobile ICBMs and possibly other SOA; and 6) combining space launch facilities and test ranges.

MAKAROV/MULLEN MEETING

¶24. (S) Orlov asked whether the U.S. side could identify possible issues that Makarov and Mullen would likely discuss in their meeting that would occur early the following week. Warner provided the following issues: the SDV limit; the limit on deployed warheads; counting rules for heavy bomber nuclear armaments; constraints and limits on mobile ICBMs; selected inspection issues; and telemetry. He also noted that the discussions might include attention to ICBMs and SLBMs in non-nuclear configuration and the offense-defense relationship.

¶25. (U) Documents exchanged.

- Russia:

-- Russian-proposed CorE Part III Section VII Procedures for Elimination of Facilities and Fixed Structures, dated November 19, 2009.

¶26. (U) Participants:

U.S.

A/S Gottemoeller (first portion of meeting)
Mr. Elliott
Mr. Hanchett
Amb Ries
Mr. Siemon
Mr. Trout
Dr. Warner
Dr. Hopkins (Int)

RUSSIA

Amb Antonov (first portion of meeting)
Col Ilin
Mr. Koshelev
Gen Orlov
Gen Poznihir
Col Ryzhkov
Col Zaytsev
Ms. Evarovskaya (Int)

¶27. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
GRIFFITHS